时间：2026年6月28日 上午9：00-12：00
地点：邵逸夫科学馆206会议室
题目：Artificial Superintelligence May be Useless: Equilibria in the Economy of Multiple AI Agents
内容摘要：With recent development of artificial intelligence, it is more common to adopt AI agents in economic activities. This paper explores the economic actions of agents, including human agents and AI agents, in an economic game of trading products/services, and the equilibria in this economy involving multiple agents. We derive a range of equilibrium results and their corresponding conditions using a Markov chain stationary distribution based model. One distinct feature of our model is that we consider the long-term utility generated by economic activities instead of their short-term benefits. For the model consisting of two agents, we fully characterize all the possible economic equilibria and conditions. Interestingly, we show that unless each agent can at least double (not merely increase) its marginal utility by purchasing the other agent's products/services, purchasing the other agent's products/services will not happen in any economic equilibrium. We further extend our results to three and more agents, where we characterize more economic equilibria. We find that in some equilibria, the “more powerful”' AI agents contribute zero utility to “less capable”' agents.
主讲人介绍：蔡欢，美国犹他大学金融学博士，清华大学金融学本科，现任美国Cornell College经济和商业系金融学副教授。主要研究方向为行为金融学、公司金融和合约理论等。研究成果发表于International Review of Finance，Journal of Behavioral Finance，The North American Journal of Economics and Finance等同行评议国际期刊。
